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FREEDOM AND THE COURT. By Henry J. Abraham.* Oxford
University Press, New York. 1977. Pp. 482. Reviewed by Eugene J.
Davidson.t
The third edition of Freedom and The Court, supplies an
updated, comprehensive review and analysis of the progress
Americans have made in the protection of their basic rights and
liberties. 2 As in prior editions, the book does not seek to cover the
entire spectrum connoted by the term "freedom." Rather, the author
confines himself to personal Rights, concepts which, as general
propositions, the vast majority of Americans invariably proclaim as
being sacred. Unfortunately, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed,
"[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases."'3 Therefore, one
of the demanding issues confronting this nation has not been simply
whether a line should be drawn between the individual's rights and
the community's rights, but how and where such a line should, or
perhaps can, be drawn. The statement, "[b]ut though the proposition
is not likely to be contested in general terms, the practical question,
where to place the limits - how to make the fitting adjustment
between individual independence and social control - is a subject on
which nearly everything remains to be done" (p. 3), is as true today
as it was when written by John Stuart Mill in 1898.
Freedom and The Court provides a scholarly, yet highly
readable, presentation of the present posture of this "fitting
adjustment" and the tortuous road travelled by the Supreme Court to
reach the current position. The first segment, composed of chapters
I, II, and III ("Introduction," "The 'Double Standard,'" and "The
Bill of Rights and Its Applicability to the States"), acts as the
necessary predicate for the remainder of the book, which focuses on
four specific Rights: due process, freedom of expression, religious
freedom, and racial equality. While most readers will be attracted to
the four Rights chapters, the first three chapters should not be
passed over lightly. Indeed, the brief first chapter identifies a
philosophy that many liberals and conservatives alike seemingly
fail to comprehend, or if they do comprehend, fail to accept, unless,
of course, they are complaining of their adversaries' noncomprehen-
* Henry L. and Grace Doherty Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs,
University of Virginia.
t B.A., 1933, New York University; J.D., 1936, New York University; Professor of
Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
1. The first edition was published in 1967; the second edition in 1972.
2. The terms rights and liberties which are used interchangeably in the book are
referred to as Rights in this review.
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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sion or nonacceptance. 4 This philosophy is that Rights and social
order are inseparable; while we must be zealous of the dissenter's
rights, the dissenter too must recognize the majority's rights.
Tyranny by the minority is as pernicious as tyranny by the
majority. The rule of law requires respect for the law. In language
worthy of a Holmes, Professor Abraham writes,
Notwithstanding the numerous philosophical argu-
ments to the contrary, disobedience of the law is barred, no
matter which valid governmental agency has pronounced it
or what small margin has enacted it. It must be barred.
Liberty is achieved only by a rule of law - which is as the
cement of society. Government cannot long endure when
any group or class of persons - no matter how just the
cause may be or how necessary remedial action may seem to
be - is permitted to decide which law it shall obey and
which it shall flout (p. 5).
The second chapter is of utmost importance to an understanding
of the dichotomy in the Court's approach to economic or proprietary
Rights as compared to its approach to personal Rights. In describing
what he correctly labels as a "double standard," Professor Abraham
demonstrates that at one time or another the Court has favored
either property Rights or personal Rights, but not both at the same
time. In earlier days, the former were prized over the latter so that
social experiments (e.g., child-labor regulations, minimum wage
laws) were given short shrift. With the advent of the New Deal
Court, this posture changed so that today the Court views with
equanimity legislation affecting proprietary Rights, assuming the
legislation to be constitutional unless proved to the contrary, but
views as suspect efforts to interfere with what have been termed
basic human freedoms (e.g., speech, press, worship, due process in
criminal trials).5 One may speculate on whether this dichotomy in
judicial constitutional analysis is fully perceived by the legal
profession, let alone the general public, and how much fruitless
litigation has ensued as a result of this failure.
4. This chapter also briefly addresses the role of the Supreme Court in acting as
arbiter of the freedom issue. While this book is not the place for a full exposition
of this judicial feat, the issue is of more than passing interest and readers are
referred to Professor Abraham's book "The Judicial Process: An Introductory
Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France" (3d ed. 1975).
5. Four justifications for this "double standard" are:
(1) The crucial nature of basic freedoms;
(2) The explicit language of the Bill of Rights;
(3) The appropriate expertise of the judiciary; and
(4) Discrepancy in access to the political process (pp. 24-32).
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The chapter on the Bill of Rights not only analyzes the
landmark cases,6 but also explores in depth the variant tests
employed by the Court's leading members in those cases. These
positions (i.e., Frankfurter's "does it shock the conscience" test,
Holmes's "does it make you vomit" test, Cardozo's "fundamental
principles" test, etc.) are distilled into four 7 distinct theories:
"Selective Incorporation" also dubbed "Honor Roll of Superior
Rights" as expressed in Cardozo's Palko v. Connecticut8 decision;
"Fair Trial" or "Case by Case" advocated by Frankfurter, and, in
the author's guarded opinion, currently favored by Burger, Black-
mun, Rehnquist and Powell; "Total Incorporation" originated by
Harlan, the elder, and adamantly proclaimed by Black; and
"Incorporation Plus," an extension of Black's theory, espoused by
Murphy and Rutledge in the former's dissent in Adamson v.
California.9 This chapter is typical of the author's somewhat
unusual - albeit interesting and informative - style which
coordinates the legal analysis of the cases with a consideration of
applicable historical, political, and societal factors. As a result, the
reader sees the "whole picture" of the Court as the people's
protagonist and principal guardian in their struggle for life and
liberty.
The four specific Rights chapters focus on the still evolving
process of line-drawing. This line-drawing is complicated by the
nature of these Rights. As described in the book, the tak of line-
drawing is difficult because the concept is ambiguous in due process,
elusive in freedom of expression, delicate and emotional in religion,
and subject to deep-seated prejudices regarding race. Notwithstand-
ing the complexity of the task, the book succeeds in both clarifying
the underlying issues and identifying the lines that have been
drawn. In the process, the author demonstrates how the line-drawing
was achieved and reinforces his thesis that, of the three branches of
government, the judiciary is the natural line-drawer because both
the legislative and executive segments are too prone to political
expediency and popular passion.
It should be noted that the author's treatment of race Rights
differs from the treatment of the other three Rights. The chapters on
due process, speech, and religion begin with discussion of the
guidelines or considerations that are basic to an understanding of
the topic covered in the chapter, and then continue with the relevant
6. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Butchers' Benevolent Association v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
7. The author notes that "close students ... can determine ... eight or nine such
positions" (p. 96).
8. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
9. 332 U.S. at 123-25.
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legal, political and societal considerations. The chapter on race
begins with a presentation of the dilemma - race in an enlightened
democratic society should not present the line drawing problems
indigenous to the other three Rights, but theory does not necessarily
govern practice. The chapter then concentrates primarily on the
problem from a historical and, to a lesser degree, political
perspective. Even the legal analysis is essentially a review of the
historic march of University v. Murray,10 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada," Sweatt v. Painter,2 Brown v. Board of Education,'3
Shelley v. Kraemer,14 etc. The final portion of the chapter, entitled
"State Action and Beyond: A True Dilemma" (pp. 415-38), and more
particularly the last three pages entitled "Coda" (pp. 438-40), assess
the issue of when private action becomes "state action" so as to
permit invocation of the fourteenth amendment. This in turn poses a
most fundamental question - how far racial egalitarianism? - a
question with which the American public and the Supreme Court
have yet to come to grips.
Before concluding, mention must be made of the interesting
trivia scattered throughout the book. Such items as Frankfurter
having been referred to as "the Emily Post of the Supreme Court" (p.
22), Holmes's statement that "if my country wants to go to hell, I am
here to help it" (p. 30), and his belief that in the area of civil rights
the average American was not very enlightened and, thus, in those
cases, judges "should not be too rigidly bound to the tenets of
judicial self-restraint" (p. 30), as well as Professor Abraham's
explanation of the term "Jim Crow" (pp. 344-45), make this very
readable book all the more so.
This edition is worthy of praise as an important and learned
contribution on a plethora of subjects including, among others, the
development of individual rights, the development of the fourteenth
amendment, and the role of the Supreme Court as the arbitrator in
the individual rights-state control imbroglio.
10. 1.69 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936), in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland
ordered admission to the University of Maryland Law School.
11. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
12. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
13. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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